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JUDICIAL INFLUENCES AND THE INSIDE-
OUTSIDE DICHOTOMY: A COMMENT ON
PROFESSOR NAGEL
RICHARD DELGADO*
Professor Nagel and Professor Brilmayer are both correct. It is
troubling that judges sometimes are pressured, influenced by outside
forces, and sometimes even respond to those pressures. At one ex-
treme end of the spectrum you have mail bombs aimed at instilling
terror in judges who might rule a certain way in civil rights cases. All
of us find those unacceptable. Plebiscites and lynchings, Robert's ex-
amples, repulse us as well. Strident marches that culminate outside
the Supreme Court building and coordinated, mass mailings to
Supreme Court justices orchestrated by special-interest groups fall in a
middle region. Some of us might think these are okay, others not.
Material appearing in law reviews or discussions overheard by a jus-
tice while visiting in the Harvard Law School faculty lounge are ac-
ceptable-although we might note self-interest operating here. These
are the types of things law professors do, so what harm could they
possibly cause?
Outside influences are troubling because, depending on the vari-
ous views of judging that Robert reviews, we want judges to be "insu-
lated," faithful to constitutional text, neutral, concerned about process
or the development of coherent moral concepts-functions that seem
incompatible with listening to clamor outside the court building or
worrying that if you rule or write the wrong way, some extremist will
send you a mail bomb.
But, these extreme examples aside, what distinguishes between
the bad and good types of clamor, between the types of outside influ-
ence that are tolerable, maybe desirable, and those that are not? Rob-
ert evaluates three ways of drawing those distinctions based either on
the type of opinion expressed or the speaker's formal or informal au-
thority. None stands up under scrutiny.
Consequently, Robert's excellent paper concludes that we must
tolerate, even welcome, a range of outside influences on the courts. I
agree with much that he says. I do have, however, a slightly different
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. This essay is a comment on
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"take" from his or Professor Brilmayer's on the nature of the problem.
And because the way one characterizes a problem like the one of
outside judicial influence affects one's outcome, he and I come to dif-
ferent conclusions.
I want to raise a slightly heretical question. I wonder whether
pressure and influence on judges trouble us not so much because they
are inconsistent with classic liberal theories of judicial review, as be-
cause they reveal something we prefer to keep from ourselves about
the ordinary, daily business of judging-namely, that legal reasoning
is often radically open-textured and indeterminate and that every
opinion contains somewhere a non-legal leap, often a value judge-
ment.' We want the pubhc-and we ourselves also want-to believe
that law is exact, fair, neutral, dispassionate, a science. We want to
believe that every case has one right answer, that trained practitioners
and judges can find that answer by applying precedent, authority, and
well-known canons of judicial reasoning, statutory interpretation, and
the like.
If the public knew that a trained lawyer can read any opinion and
put his or her finger on the point where the judge makes a value judg-
ment, selects this rather than that line of authority, this precedent, this
formulaic legal maxim rather than that-the point, in short, where the
judge is saying I want this party to win-then we would all be in
trouble. So, this side of legal reasoning must be kept well hidden.
Outside influences, then, disturb us because they are these things
writ large. They imply that law and judging contain more elements of
will, habit, and simple preference than we would like.2 So, Robert is
right: we do have a mythology opposing outside influences, one that
cannot be grounded in theories of judicial review. But his solution,
which is to admit--even to welcome--outside sociocultural factors
leaves us little better off. At the end of his paper, Robert urges that
judges "pay attention to virtually our whole political and social his-
tory... not only what has been desired and said but also what has
been accepted and left unspoken."3
This is a much more sophisticated view of judging than that em-
1. For a discussion of the indeterminacy thesis, see generally THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PRO-
GRESSIVE CRITQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (collection of essays on critical legal studies).
2. For more complete discussions of this general thesis, see Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103
HARv. L. REV. 1872 (1990); Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 766 VA.
L. REV. 95 (1990) [hereinafter Just a Story]; Delgado, Legal Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A
Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989) [hereinafter Legal Storytelling]; Delgado, Derrick
Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923 (1988) [hereinafter
Ever Saved?].




braced by legal formalism, the view the public holds of law. In
Nagel's broader view, judges make policy, and they make it by refer-
ence to our entire cultural history. But I wonder if this doesn't still
exemplify-at a higher level-yearning for one answer, for certainty.
To make "wise and moral public policy," as Robert puts it, judges will
consult a range of cultural and historic narratives and expressions.
The trouble, as I've been urging in a series of law review articles
with the words "story" or "storytelling" in their titles, is that we do
not, and probably cannot, do that.4 Instead we attend to stories-to
explanations of culture and experience-that are familiar, that are
safe, that validate our own experiences. Law professors are not excep-
tions to this generalization, and I would bet most judges are not either.
So, stories and interpretations that deviate from our own seem strange
and foreign, unattractive, coercive, "political." They carry little au-
thority. We dismiss them, give them little weight. This may explain
why dissenters often seem to be playing to the crowd, being political.
Let me give you an example. During the Constitution's Bicentennial,
every hamlet, every city, every professional association celebrated the
signing of our founding document. Lawyers and law professors gave
speeches extolling that paper. Law reviews devoted pages and entire
issues to the Constitution and its wondrous history. The year passed
in a sort of rosy glow. But for many people of color, and for some
feminists, there was little rosy glow. The celebrations rang hollow, for
we were well aware that the original document co-existed with slavery
and female subjugation, indeed implicitly or explicitly protected the
former institution in no fewer than ten passages.5 Our voices were
distinctly absent from the songs of praise.
To us, the celebrations sounded coercive, with overtones of cul-
tural supremacy. It took Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing in the
Harvard Law Review, to give voice to some of these misgivings.' The
point is not whether Marshall or the celebrants were right. The point
is in the contrast. One interpretation of constitutional history-of the
interpretation to be given our most basic document-struck one group
as self-evident and obvious, another as dangerously wrong.
We could, of course, seek out narratives and points of view other
than our own, thereby enriching ourselves in the process. But the
tragedy is that we won't, except to a very limited extent. Cultural
4. See Just a Story, supra note 2; Delgado & Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories? Law
Reform, Critical Librarianship and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1989); Legal
Storytelling, supra note 2.
5. The clauses are reprinted and discussed in Ever Saved?, supra note 2, at 933 n.42.
6. Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1987).
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narratives and understandings other than the ones we are used to will
always strike us as political, coercive, false, one-sided, irresponsible,
not worthy of our consideration, and certainly not worth incorporat-
ing into law. We construct social reality. This construction is the
greatest act of power we can carry out. And we're not about to share
that power lightly with persons not of our kind or social class.7
And so, Robert's observation that we need to attend to more than
mere doctrine and precedent, while true, helps only a little. We escape
from one form of prison-legal formalism-to a larger one, but no less
a prison. And it is no safer, no more secure, no more defensible in the
one-true-answer sense than the other one.
A parting word about silences, eloquent and otherwise. Silences
may, as Robert points out, indicate acquiescence and satisfaction. But
they, too, are indeterminate. Silence may indicate consent, but may
just as easily signal that the silenced group has just plain given up or
been browbeaten into silence. Feminists write about silencing of view-
points and voices.' Men complete sentences for women and co-opt
their arguments. Many worry why women and minorities do not
speak up in the classroom; surely it cannot be anything that we are
saying or doing, can it?
The interpretation one puts on silence is everything, as it is with
cultural expressions of a positive sort, like a political speech or a cul-
tural symbol. And so, we are no closer to what it all means for judges.
And our dilemma is just as troubling as before.
7. See Note, Racism and Race Relations in the University, 76 VA. L. REV. 295 (1990), making this
point.
8. Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices. New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in
the tow. 42 MIAMI L. REV. 29, 42 (1987).
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